The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum

Mwangi Kimenyi and William Shughart

Constitutional Political Economy, 2010, vol. 21, issue 1, 27 pages

Keywords: Constitutions; Direct democracy; Public goods; Interest groups; Ethnic divisions; D72; H4; H77; O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-008-9062-4

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