Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights

Feler Bose ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2010, vol. 21, issue 4, 336-359

Keywords: Indian constitution; Property rights; Civil rights; Basic structure doctrine; Public interest litigation; Veto bargaining model; Veto player framework; Supreme Court; Parliament; D-74; K-11; K-40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-010-9088-2 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:21:y:2010:i:4:p:336-359

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-010-9088-2

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().