Do departures from democratic accountability compromise the stability of public finances? Keynesianism, central banking, and minority governments in the Canadian system of party government, 1867–2009

J. Stephen Ferris, Stanley Winer () and Bernard Grofman ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2012, vol. 23, issue 3, 213-243

Keywords: Westminster parliamentary government; Accountability; Ideational and institutional factors; Sustainability of public debt; Keynesianism; Central banking; Minority government; Cointegration; Economic history of Canada; D72; D78; E58; E62; H11; H63; H68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Do Departures from Democratic Accountability Compromise the Stability of Public Finances? Keynesianism, Central Banking, and Minority Governments in the Canadian System of Party Government, 1867 – 2009 (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-012-9123-6

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