Analytic radicalism

Brad Taylor ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, vol. 24, issue 2, 166-172

Abstract: Brennan and Hamlin provide a normative justification for dispositional conservatism based on the concave value functions which give rise to quasi-risk aversion. This note modifies this argument for “analytic conservatism” by allowing jurisdictional exit in response to institutional decline. By providing a welfare floor which limits the cost of failure, exit reverses the normative implications of Brennan and Hamlin’s argument, making risk-neutral agents quasi-risk seeking and justifying a radical disposition to reform under some circumstances. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Conservatism; Radicalism; Tiebout competition; Exit; Risk preference; Constitutional political economy; D61; D81; H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-013-9134-y

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