EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?

Fabio Padovano () and Ilaria Petrarca

Constitutional Political Economy, 2013, vol. 24, issue 4, 336-351

Abstract: We study the decisions of a politician who maximizes his probability of being re-elected, which depends on the enactment of legislative instruments defined ‘scandalous’ because of their highly redistributive content. The agents are a politician and the voters; the legislative instruments available to the legislator are ordinary and executive laws, which differ according to their visibility. The theoretical model predicts that ‘scandalous’ legislation tends to be passed at the beginning of the legislature, while ‘non scandalous’, broader legislation, is approved mostly at the end of the legislation. Scandalous decisions, moreover, tend to be implemented by means of less visible executive legislation, while ordinary acts are mainly used to implement non scandalous decisions. This explanation of the genesis of legislation cycles is consistent with the findings of the empirical literature. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Legislation cycle; Ordinary legislation; Executive legislation; Redistribution; D83; H71; C21; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-013-9145-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: When and how politicians take 'scandalous' decisions? (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:4:p:336-351

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-013-9145-8

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2020-06-26
Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:4:p:336-351