The role of homo oeconomicus in the political economy of James Buchanan

Gebhard Kirchgässner

Constitutional Political Economy, 2014, vol. 25, issue 1, 2-17

Abstract: Whenever the economic model of behavior is to be applied, the utility function has—at least somewhat—to be specified. Buchanan generally prefers to apply a rather narrow version. However, he acknowledges that it is hardly possible to explain actual behavior of individuals with such a version, so in performing empirical economic research he accepts that we have to use a more open one. He also acknowledges that people might behave differently in markets than they do in politics; other-regarding behavior might be more pronounced in politics as compared to markets. Which version should be applied in constitutional economics, however, is a different question. Following a long ongoing tradition in political philosophy, he insists that—for methodological reasons—the narrow version is the correct one to be applied; this is the way to compare different sets of rules when analyzing the possible abuse of power by rulers in order to prevent it as far as possible. The same should also be taken into account when analyzing the process of policy advice. The narrow homo oeconomicus model should, however, not be misunderstood as a normative prescription. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Homo oeconomicus; Economic model of behavior; Empirical public choice; Constitutional economics; Self-interest; Policy advice; James Buchanan; B41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-014-9157-z

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