Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration

David Stadelmann, Reiner Eichenberger () and Marco Portmann

Constitutional Political Economy, 2014, vol. 25, issue 2, 207-229

Abstract: The separation of powers is endogenous to the politico-economic process, and thus to politicians’ self-interest. Only little is known about what really drives politicians’ behavior when shaping institutional rules with respect to the separation of powers. We econometrically compare votes of parliamentary representatives and their constituents on a popular initiative that directly aimed at weakening the separation of powers in 1922 in Switzerland. We analyze whether the strength of individual ties to the public service affect representatives’ behavior, holding constituents’ preferences constant. Our results indicate that while politicians tend to represent their constituents’ preferences, representatives with ties to the public service have a higher probability of supporting the eligibility of public servants for the legislature. Thus, they favor reducing the separation of powers between legislature and administration. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Keywords: Separation of powers; Administration; Public servants; Legislative voting; Constituents’ preferences; D72; D73; H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:25:y:2014:i:2:p:207-229

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-014-9162-2

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