The mature limited access order at the doorstep: Imperial Germany and contemporary China in transition

Erik Grimmer-Solem ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2015, vol. 26, issue 1, 103-120

Abstract: A basic premise of the limited/open access orders framework of North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast is a variant of the Hayek–Friedman hypothesis that economic and political freedom sustain each other. Keys to this framework are the specific “doorstep” conditions that enable a transition from limited to open access, which the authors draw from the historical experience of Britain, France and the United States. This essay analyzes the transition process of Imperial Germany to reveal that maintaining economic competition did not depend on democracy and that the middle classes became stakeholders in authoritarianism. It then explores the specific challenges posed by this large, mature limited access order as it was integrated into an international system sustained by a declining liberal hegemon, Great Britain. The refinements of the framework suggested by the case of Imperial Germany allow for a better understanding of some of the parallel transition processes in present-day China and its evolving relationship to both the United States and the current international order. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Development; Transition; Limited/open access order; Hayek–Friedman hypothesis; International order; Germany; China; F02; F15; F50; F51; F63; N13; N15; P16; P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-014-9169-8

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