Income and the stability of democracy: Pushing beyond the borders of logic to explain a strong correlation?

Federico Traversa ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2015, vol. 26, issue 2, 136 pages

Abstract: The statistical relationship between economic development and duration of democracy is one of the strongest in Political Science. Nevertheless, the theoretical mechanisms underlying this statistical link have been debated for decades. Adam Przeworski has proposed the simplest explanation, by indicating that wealth itself increases the probability of sustaining democracy, economic development and democratic stability are thus directly related. This paper discusses whether the assumptions of the influential model of Przeworski (Public Choice, 123(3–4):253–273. doi: 10.1007/s11127-005-7163-4 , 2005 ) are plausible, and extends the analysis to a setting in which: (a) absolute per capita income varies; (b) people have preference for democracy independently of income; and (c) consumption is subject to diminishing marginal utility. The analysis demonstrates that the mechanics proposed by Przeworski ( 2005 ) are particularly recursive. One of the assumptions in his model implies in and of itself the final conclusion of the analysis, and if this contentious cornerstone is removed or slightly changed, it is no longer possible to conclude that economic development could create per se any democratic equilibrium. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Keywords: Democratic Stability; Economic Development; Relative Income; Mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-014-9175-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:26:y:2015:i:2:p:121-136

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-014-9175-x

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().