State provision of constitutional goods

Romain Espinosa

Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, vol. 27, issue 1, 40 pages

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of constitutional rights on the level of public expenditure in a large sample of countries. To do so, we construct a panel of 73 countries from 1960 to 2011. We first investigate factors that drive constitutional changes regarding constitutional rights. To address potential endogeneity concerns in the choice of constitutional rules, we rely on an instrumental variable within estimation (country and time fixed effects) to estimate the impact of constitutional rights on government size. We find that larger governments tend to inscribe fewer rights in their constitutions, but we do not detect any impact of constitutional rights on the government size. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Keywords: Constitutional rights; Constitutional economics; Government expenditure; Government size; Endogenous constitutions; E60; H50; K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-015-9198-y

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