Rent seeking and the economics of corruption

Toke Aidt

Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, vol. 27, issue 2, No 4, 142-157

Abstract: Abstract The paper studies the influence of Tullock (West Econ J 5:224–232, 1967) and the rent-seeking literature more generally on the study of corruption. The theoretical corruption literature with its emphasis on principal-agent relationships within government and rent creation by corruption politicians has largely, but not entirely, overlooked that contestable rents encourage unproductive use of real resources in seeking these rents. As a consequence, the literature underestimates the value of corruption control and the cost of corruption itself.

Keywords: Rent seeking; Corruption; Bribes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (53)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9215-9

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