EU enlargement and satisfaction with democracy: a peculiar case of immiserizing growth

Barbara Dluhosch, Daniel Horgos and Klaus Zimmermann
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Barbara Dluhosch: Helmut Schmidt University – University FAF Hamburg

Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, vol. 27, issue 3, No 3, 273-298

Abstract: Abstract Studies on EU enlargement mostly focus on its welfare-economic and much less so on its public-choice dimension. Yet, the latter may be as important as the former when it comes to sustain integration. This paper aims at filling the gap by exploring theoretically and empirically how enlargement of multi-level systems like the EU affects satisfaction with democracy . In order to assess the effects of a widening in membership, we present a novel approach that draws on the probability of being outvoted. We find that, given the institutional arrangement, enlargement tends to depress satisfaction with democracy. Our theoretical results are backed by panel-data evidence for six European economies displaying a significant decline in satisfaction with democracy with growth in EU-membership.

Keywords: European Union; Enlargement; Multi-level systems; Democracy; Regime satisfaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F55 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: EU Enlargement and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Peculiar Case of Immizerising Growth (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-015-9202-6

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