Fairness and efficiency in US Revolutionary War takings and post-war debt redemption

Jonathan Stone and Jeffrey Wagner
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Jonathan Stone: Rochester Institute of Technology

Constitutional Political Economy, 2016, vol. 27, issue 4, No 3, 399-417

Abstract: Abstract Many have noted the debate amongst Hamilton, Jefferson, and others on compensating original versus final US Revolutionary War debt holders upon federal assumption of state debts in 1790. However, to our knowledge the economics literature has not yet proposed a theoretical model of the argument. The purpose of this paper is to propose a simple household-level economic model to capture the most salient aspects of the debate, including the role of military impressment and the emergence of the Takings Clause of the US Constitution.

Keywords: Debt redemption; Takings Clause; US Revolutionary War debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H13 N41 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9219-5

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