Tullock on the common law: a loose-cannon iconoclast in action?

Stefan Voigt

Constitutional Political Economy, 2017, vol. 28, issue 1, No 3, 35-47

Abstract: Abstract Gordon Tullock has been celebrated as an innovative thinker in many areas of public choice. He was also among the first to analyze the law based on the economic approach, yet, his contributions to Law and Economics have been met with skepticism or even outright ignorance. In this paper, I focus on Tullock’s papers dealing with the common law and argue that they contain important insights that have been ignored in the debate regarding legal origins.

Keywords: Law and Economics; Legal Origins; Jury; Adversary versus Inquisitorial Procedure; Arbitration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K00 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-016-9231-9

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