EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The debt brake of the German states: a faulty design?

Gebhard Kirchgässner

Constitutional Political Economy, 2017, vol. 28, issue 3, No 3, 257-269

Abstract: Abstract The debt brake for German states, which demands that they are forbidden from taking up new net debt from 2020 onwards, has two major shortcomings. First, states do not have tax autonomy. In fiscal crises, they can only make adjustments to expenditure but not on the revenue side. Given the fact that most expenditure is—at least in the short term—predetermined by law, in such a crisis a balanced budget without new debt is hardly feasible. Second, the measure does not take into account that large investments, in particular in small regional units, can scarcely be financed by current expenditure. Thus, there is a high probability that at least some states will take up new net debt even after 2020 and, therefore, violate the rules of the debt brake.

Keywords: Debt brake; Balanced budget requirement; Tax autonomy; Investment expenditure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H61 H63 H74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-017-9240-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:28:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-017-9240-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-017-9240-3

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:28:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-017-9240-3