Managing judges mathematically: an empirical study of the medical malpractice litigations in Shanghai

Wei Zhang ()
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Wei Zhang: Singapore Management University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2017, vol. 28, issue 4, No 4, 373-406

Abstract: Abstract The post-Mao China has been increasingly managed mathematically, not the least in its judicial system. In this paper, I looked into some of the mathematical indicators used to judge the performance of judges in this nation, and ascertained their effects on the judicial decisions on medical malpractices in Shanghai. The findings of this paper support the previous study that qualitatively identified the judicial responses to such a quantified evaluation system. Underlying the effect of performance indicators is the Chinese judiciary’s bending toward populist pressure. Essentially, therefore, this paper serves to place in perspective the judicial populism well documented in the latest literature on Chinese judiciary. At the same time, however, my study also endorses the theory on courts’ reluctance to exercise discretion in a hierarchical judicial system. Thus, as hinted by the data, the actual behaviors of Chinese judges might be complex under a combination of institutional constraints embodying policy preferences of political leaders as well as structural characteristics of the judiciary.

Keywords: Medical malpractice; Judicial populism; Quantified performance indicators; Bureaucracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K40 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-017-9235-0

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