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Regime types, ideological leanings, and the natural resource curse

Chong-Sup Kim () and Seungho Lee ()
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Chong-Sup Kim: Seoul National University
Seungho Lee: Korea Military Academy

Constitutional Political Economy, 2018, vol. 29, issue 1, No 1, 19 pages

Abstract: Abstract While many consider institutional quality as a central explanatory variable when finding what causes the variance in per capita GDP growth performance of resource-abundant countries, this paper attempts to focus on more structural factors: regime type and its ideological approaches to economic policy. Several joint effects of natural resource abundance and regime type on growth are found. The natural resource curse is likely to be more severe in authoritarian regimes than democratic regimes. Among democracies, it is found that the natural resource curse is more salient in presidential regimes than in parliamentary regimes. This paper also suggests that the natural resource curse is more likely when a certain type of democratic regime coincides with a particular ideological orientation of the regime with respect to economic policy. Presidential democracies with left-wing economic policy are found to be least growth enhancing among the combinations between regime type and its economic ideology offered, given similar levels of natural resource abundance.

Keywords: Natural resource curse; Regime type; Authoritarian regimes; Presidential democracies; Parliamentary democracies; Economic ideology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-017-9245-y

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