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Medieval representative assemblies: collective action and antecedents of limited government

Alexander Salter and Andrew T. Young ()
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Andrew T. Young: Texas Tech University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2018, vol. 29, issue 2, 171-192

Abstract: Abstract Medieval monarchs in Western Europe responded to financial and military pressures by instituting representative assemblies. Three estates (classes; orders) were represented in these assemblies: clergy, nobility, and burghers. In the late medieval and early modern periods, some states tended towards absolutism (e.g., France); others towards constitutional monarchy (e.g., England). The German historian Otto Hintze conjectured that two-chamber assemblies were more likely to resist monarchical encroachments on their political authority than three-chamber assemblies. We argue that the two- versus three-chamber distinction is coincidental to what was truly relevant: whether chambers were estate-based or had mixed representation from multiple estates. We provide a comparative institutional analysis that emphasizes political bargaining and the costs of expressing special versus common interests. This analysis suggests that mixed representation assemblies, all else equal, provided a stronger check on absolutism than their estate-based counterparts. We also provide historical case studies of France and England that lend insights into why an estate-based Estates General arose in the former, while a mixed representation Parliament arose in the latter.

Keywords: Medieval economic history; Comparative economic development; Medieval constitution; Polycentric governance; Political property rights; Representative assemblies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N44 O10 O52 P50 K00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:29:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-018-9258-1