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The political economy of Kulturkampf: evidence from imperial Prussia and republican Turkey

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis () and Theocharis Grigoriadis ()
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Ioannis N. Grigoriadis: Bilkent University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2018, vol. 29, issue 3, 339-369

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes the political incentives of Kulturkampf and the implementation of secularization in imperial Prussia and republican Turkey. A game-theoretic model defining Kulturkampf as a static game between priests and the executive is proposed. The willingness of priests to accept the government’s offer and be transformed into bureaucratic experts varies. Individualist priests are easier to recruit as they care more about their personal welfare than social distribution by the church, whereas the reverse holds for collectivist priests. Nevertheless, the long-run success of the Kulturkampf depends on the effective recruitment of collectivist priests and their entry into formal politics in favor of the executive.

Keywords: Kulturkampf; Prussia; Turkey; Secularism; Protestantism; Catholicism; Islam; Enforcement; Bureaucracy; Expertise (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P16 P51 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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