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The constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments: a study of open and limited access

Louis Corriveau ()
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Louis Corriveau: Université de Moncton

Constitutional Political Economy, 2018, vol. 29, issue 3, No 2, 268-280

Abstract: Abstract I expound a game theoretical model of the constitution of patron–client relations and patronage appointments. For all parameter values, the game has open access equilibriums, where patronage does not occur. For some parameter values, it has also a limited access equilibrium, where patronage does occur. I prove open and limited access equilibriums are not Pareto-comparable to one another. Defining social welfare in utilitarian terms, I prove also that social welfare is maximised in a particular open access equilibrium, but that a limited access equilibrium can be a second-best solution, when it exists.

Keywords: Patron; Client; Patronage; Clientelism; Nepotism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 P47 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9266-1

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