Path dependence and transitions from tyranny to democracy: evidence from ancient Greece

Robert K. Fleck () and F. Andrew Hanssen ()
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Robert K. Fleck: Clemson University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2018, vol. 29, issue 4, No 1, 388 pages

Abstract: Abstract For empirical research on the effects of institutions, an important question is whether a given institutional type will generate different outcomes depending on the circumstances that give rise to that institution. In this paper, we examine a unique historical episode in which a specific type of institution—rule by a tyrant—arose in similar states yet differed in terms of whether the impetus came from local support or external influences. Over the course of the sixth century BCE, a substantial subset of Greek poleis (city–states) experienced a period of tyranny. In some cases, the tyrant came to power with the support of local elites, yet in other cases, the tyrant was imposed by a conquering power, Persia. Although it is likely that the tyrants’ proponents—whether local elites or Persian rulers—sought to increase stability and maintain policies necessary for wealth creation, the long run effects of tyranny differed: In poleis where the rise of a tyrant would have depended on local support, a record of tyranny predicts a greater propensity for subsequent development of democracy. By contrast, in poleis where the rise of a tyrant would have depended on Persian support, a record of tyranny has a weak (and perhaps negative) association with subsequent development of democracy. These findings illustrate both the long-run importance of institutional paths and the difficulty in transplanting institutions.

Keywords: Political economy; Ancient Greece; Path dependence; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H4 K00 N00 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9268-z

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