Natural persons, corporate actors, and constitutions
James Coleman
Constitutional Political Economy, 1991, vol. 2, issue 1, 106 pages
Abstract:
Extending the concept of efficiency beyond economic markets to social transactions generally, this paper asks the question whether social efficiency might not be better realized by removing the barriers to transactions between political and economic resources. With political rights (i.e. resources) held by natural persons, and economic resources held by corporate actors, such transactions could in principle replace taxation for redistribution, as a more efficient method of redistribution, intrinsic to the socio-political system. Such politico-economic transactions would supplement the primary means of distribution of the social product in an economic system, that is wages for productive labor. In the paper it is argued that this primary means of distribution is increasingly ineffective as the economy becomes increasingly interdependent. This change places an increasing burden on the “second round” of distribution through taxation, and forces consideration of a less defective and more theoretically sound means of supplementary income distribution. Copyright George Mason University 1991
Date: 1991
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02393227 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:2:y:1991:i:1:p:81-106
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/BF02393227
Access Statistics for this article
Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt
More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().