Madison's constitutional political economy: Principles for a liberal order

James Dorn

Constitutional Political Economy, 1991, vol. 2, issue 2, 163-186

Abstract: When persons are modelled as self-interested in politics ... the constitutional challenge becomes one of constructing and designing framework institutions or rules that will, to the maximum extent possible, limit the exercise of such interest in exploitative ways and direct such interest to furtherance of the general interest. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover the roots of a public choice perspective ... in the writings of the American Founders, and most notably in James Madison's contributions toThe Federalist Papers. Copyright George Mason University 1991

Date: 1991
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02404426

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