Organic constitutions and common law

Bruce Yandle

Constitutional Political Economy, 1991, vol. 2, issue 2, 225-241

Abstract: Constitutions may be viewed as purely political instruments developed by wise and strong leaders and imposed on a loosely organized society. The alternate view taken in this paper sees a nation's constitution as being rooted in the norms of individuals that form communities and states. Constitutions grow from within; they are not imposed from outside. The history of constitutional development in England is part and parcel of the history of Common Law, which growing informally from small groups finally encompassed the nation-state to form a basis for constitutional government. The integrity of the law was rooted in the integrity of the individuals that formed the constitutional community. Copyright George Mason University 1991

Date: 1991
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02404429

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