Political polarization, term length and too much delegation

Carsten Hefeker

Constitutional Political Economy, 2019, vol. 30, issue 1, No 3, 50-69

Abstract: Abstract What is the strategic incentive for governments and societies to delegate decision making to independent agents? I develop a framework taking into account preference uncertainty and the term length of independent agents in an environment with electoral and preference uncertainty and political polarization. Governments and societies face a trade-off concerning the predictability of decisions and the adaptability of to changing preferences. I find that governments, in general, tend to delegate too much and for too long from the point of view of society.

Keywords: Delegation; Principal agency problem; Political polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D7 D81 D82 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9265-2

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