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Governance and the dimensions of autocracy

Ryan Murphy ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2019, vol. 30, issue 2, No 1, 148 pages

Abstract: Abstract Recent work at the frontiers of classical liberal political economy has reconsidered the idea that certain autocratic political institutions may improve on the consensus liberal, constitutional democratic political institutions. This paper will discuss conceptually how these new arguments, predatory forms of autocracy, the status quo of constitutional democracy, and the proponents of more majoritarian forms of democratic governance should be understood in terms of one another. It will then perform a simple empirical examination of the modern world, looking at the quality of governance by country by the quality of its democracy, conditional on a country’s economic output, education, and culture. Examples of autocracy with good governance, even when conditioning on these other variables, are sufficiently rare to raise serious questions for the new classical liberal proponents of autocracy.

Keywords: Democracy; Autocracy; Governance; Executive constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O43 P50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-018-9270-5

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