Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking

Patrick A. McLaughlin, Adam C. Smith () and Russell Sobel
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Patrick A. McLaughlin: George Mason University
Adam C. Smith: Johnson and Wales University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2019, vol. 30, issue 2, No 5, 234 pages

Abstract: Abstract Interest groups ‘caught’ influencing public policy solely for private gain risk public backlash. These risks can be diminished, and rent seeking efforts made more successful, when moral or social arguments are employed in pushing for changes to public policy. Following Yandle’s Bootlegger and Baptist model, we postulate this risk differential should manifest itself in regulatory output with social regulations being more responsive to political influence than economic regulations. We test, and confirm, our theory using data on economic and social regulations from the new RegData project matched with data on campaign contributions and lobbying activity at the industry level.

Keywords: Rent seeking; Social regulation; Bootleggers and Baptists (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 H42 K20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-019-09278-2

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