Determinants of governmental support of Russian companies: lessons on industrial policy, rent-seeking and corruption

Dennis Coates, Iuliia Naidenova and Petr Parshakov

Constitutional Political Economy, 2019, vol. 30, issue 4, No 4, 438-466

Abstract: Abstract The Russian government has programs to assist Russian companies with financial and organizational support. Award of procurement contracts may also serve as assistance to companies. This paper uses data from a survey of Russian companies to draw inferences about the motivation behind the choice of recipients. Possible motivations are an intent to foster economic development, successful rent-seeking by recipients or simply corruption. The evidence is mixed. There is support for both the economic development motive and rent-seeking in the analysis of financial and organizational support. A role for corruption is most evident in the procurement contract results.

Keywords: Government support; Procurement; Industrial policy; Bribery; Public choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H00 H57 L38 O25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-019-09289-z

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