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Turn-taking in office

Daniel Smith

Constitutional Political Economy, 2020, vol. 31, issue 2, No 4, 205-226

Abstract: Abstract This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the adoption of turn-taking in office. Turn-taking in office is where two or more individuals are elected to serve individual terms for the same public office, with the exclusive right to exercise the public office rotating among those elected individuals at intervals shorter than the term. Turn-taking enables the benefits of shorter tenures to be realized without incurring, to the same extent, the costs associated with setting an equivalently shortened term and term limit regime. Turn-taking would be most likely to emerge among a factional electorate in order to generate support for shared governance institutions. A case study of three high-level public offices in the Republic of Venice provides evidence of the operation of turn-taking. The tripartite presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a modern-day example of some aspects of office turn-taking in operation.

Keywords: Public choice; Term limits; Venice; Economic history; Bosnia and herzegovina (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09308-4

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