Allocation of village public goods at community level: does political reservation help?

Vivekananda Mukherjee, Saheli Bose and Malabika Roy
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Saheli Bose: Jadavpur University
Malabika Roy: Jadavpur University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2020, vol. 31, issue 3, No 5, 363-393

Abstract: Abstract It has been empirically observed that reserving seats for leaders belonging to disadvantaged social groups at the local level improves targeting of household public goods to households belonging to these groups. However, it is not clear whether a similar result holds for the allocation of village public goods that have limited spillover effects across households in a village, such as repair and maintenance of access roads to households, streetlights, sewer lines, etc. The present paper uses locational data collected from a sample of Indian villages and applies spatial econometrics to test whether political reservations for elected representatives increase allocations to households belonging to the reserved community, especially when they are in the minority. The results show that for certain types of village public goods, political reservations produce favourable allocations for the reserved community when locational clustering of the communities is present.

Keywords: Village public goods; Local government; Political reservation; Locational data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 H75 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09309-3

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