Power sharing at the local level: evidence on opting-in for non-citizen voting rights

Alois Stutzer and Michaela Slotwinski ()
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Michaela Slotwinski: University of Basel

Constitutional Political Economy, 2021, vol. 32, issue 1, No 1, 30 pages

Abstract: Abstract The enfranchisement of foreigners is likely one of the most controversial frontiers of institutional change in developed democracies, which are experiencing an increasing number of non-citizen residents. We study the conditions under which citizens are willing to share power with non-citizens. To this end, we exploit the setting of the Swiss canton of Grisons, where municipalities are free to decide on the introduction of non-citizen voting rights at the local level (a so called opting-in regime). Consistent with the power dilution hypothesis, we find that enfranchisement is less likely when the share of resident foreigners is large. Moreover, municipalities with a large language/cultural minority are less likely to formally involve foreigners. In contrast, municipality mergers seem to act as an institutional catalyst, promoting democratic reforms. A supplementary panel analysis on electoral support for an opting-in regime in the canton of Zurich also backs the power dilution hypothesis, showing that a larger share of foreigners reduces support for an extension of voting rights.

Keywords: Non-citizen voting rights; Opting-in; Power sharing; Democratization; D72; D78; J15; K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Power Sharing at the Local Level: Evidence on Opting-In for Non-Citizen Voting Rights (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09322-6

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