Islam-based legal language and state governance: democracy, strength of the judiciary and human rights

Emilia Justyna Powell (), Steven Christian McDowell, Robert O’Brien and Julia Oksasoglu
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Emilia Justyna Powell: University of Notre Dame
Steven Christian McDowell: Los Rios Community College District
Robert O’Brien: UCLA School of Law
Julia Oksasoglu: Columbia Law School

Constitutional Political Economy, 2021, vol. 32, issue 3, No 6, 376-412

Abstract: Abstract States embracing Islam-based laws are frequently seen as struggling with establishing democratic institutions, jeopardizing human rights and encouraging executive encroachment on the judiciary. This paper explores whether the presence of Islam-based legal language in a domestic legal system is associated with lower levels of electoral democracy, fewer protections for private liberties, women’s rights, and a weak judiciary. Relying on original data covering laws in 29 Islamic law states (2001–2012), we focus on Islam-based legal language in these states’ constitutional and subconstitutional domestic legal systems. By itself, Islam-based legal language is not associated with a weak judiciary or the absence of political liberties. However, subconstitutional—particularly legislative—commitments to Islam-based legal language are frequently associated with lower levels of democracy and fewer protections for private liberties and women’s rights.

Keywords: Islamic law; Comparative law; Human rights; Constitutional law; Strength of the judiciary (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K10 K38 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-019-09298-y

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