Vulnerability, due process, and reform in modern Mexico

Milena Ang () and Yuna Blajer de la Garza ()
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Milena Ang: University of Chicago
Yuna Blajer de la Garza: Stanford University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2021, vol. 32, issue 3, No 5, 346-375

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we examine the relationship between socioeconomic vulnerabilities and due process violations in contemporary Mexico, using a novel survey of imprisoned populations. We further investigate whether institutional reforms—in particular, the 2008 reform that constitutionally mandated the provision of trained public defenders for those without private counsel—help offset the impact of preexisting socioeconomic disparities on the likelihood of suffering a due process violation. We find that women, indigenous people, and people with less schooling are more likely to suffer a due process violation. This finding, is, unfortunately, not surprising. The 2008 constitutionally mandated reform to provide quality public defenders has done little to alleviate this situation. Although it has improved the experience of defendants overall—whether represented by private or public counsel—it has failed to create an office of public defenders that successfully functions as an equalizing mechanism that offsets pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities. Instead, our analysis suggests that those most benefited by these reforms are those who did not need them as much to begin with: those who rely on private lawyers for their legal representation. This paper contributes to the literature that critically examines the idea of equality under the law and the mechanisms that seek to guarantee it.

Keywords: Due process; Vulnerability; Inequality; Public defender; Judicial politics; Mexico (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I30 K40 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09305-7

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