Power in office: presidents, governments, and parliaments in the institutional design of contemporary democracies

Giuseppe Ieraci ()
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Giuseppe Ieraci: Università degli Studi di Trieste

Constitutional Political Economy, 2021, vol. 32, issue 4, No 1, 413-430

Abstract: Abstract The institutional design of democratic regimes has attracted much attention from a legal and political perspective, because it affects the actual distribution of power among political actors and the effectiveness of their decisions. The article advances a classification of the democratic institutional design, with particular reference to the triangular interactions among Presidents, Governments, and Parliaments. Moving from the assumption that the arrangements among these three top political institutions identify the main patterns of the democratic government, the distinction among Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential systems set by the constitutional law is rejected and a new classification schema is advanced. In this new perspective, the institutional design of democracy consists of the institutional roles of authority, procedural resources attached to them and arenas of confrontation among the roles.

Keywords: Presidents; Governments; Parliaments; Institutional design; Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09318-2

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