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Where you stand depends on where you live: county voting on the Texas secession referendum

Curtis Bram and Michael Munger ()
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Curtis Bram: Duke University
Michael Munger: Duke University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2022, vol. 33, issue 1, No 4, 67-79

Abstract: Abstract During the first half of the 19th century, Western Texas was a “trap baited with grass” that attracted migrants hoping to farm. When settlers on the wrong side of an unknown, invisible line could not build successful farms, residents in those counties voted to remain in the Union at far higher rates than residents in neighboring counties who could farm. The connection between the vote and economic interest was obvious, as those without suitable land could not make use of enslaved labor, which was too expensive given the implicit marginal product of labor. Because the location of settlement was plausibly random, these results highlight the importance of economic interest as a determinant of even fundamental moral beliefs that affect vote choice.

Keywords: Voting; Secession; Slavery; Constitutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P16 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09334-w

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