The organization of volunteer battalions in Ukraine

Garrett Ryan Wood ()
Additional contact information
Garrett Ryan Wood: Virginia Wesleyan University

Constitutional Political Economy, 2022, vol. 33, issue 2, No 1, 115-134

Abstract: Abstract When war broke out in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the government of Ukraine failed to provide adequate defense to maintain its territorial integrity. In the wake of this government failure, several private volunteer efforts arose to meet popular demand for military action against Russian-backed Separatists. These volunteer battalions had to find alternative methods of aligning their incentives with the population wishing to be defended, and alternative methods of aligning the incentives of their leadership and their recruits. The success of these battalions depended on the potential for political careers and favors, the strength of reputation mechanisms in small communities, and the potential for loot and spoils. These factors shaped the size, characteristics, and activities of the volunteer battalions.

Keywords: Public goods; Voluntary provision; National defense; Organizational structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H41 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-021-09342-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:33:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-021-09342-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-021-09342-w

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().