Clientelism or public goods: dilemma in a ‘divided democracy’

Soumyanetra Munshi ()
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Soumyanetra Munshi: Indian Statistical Institute (ISI)

Constitutional Political Economy, 2022, vol. 33, issue 4, No 6, 483-506

Abstract: Abstract An ‘elite’ party caters to ‘elite’ voters, while a ‘non-elite’ party caters to ‘non-elite’ voters. Now, the ‘elite’ party wants to expand its support base to include ‘non-elite’ voters. It can do so using one of two possible strategies—it can provide them public goods or it can dole out clientelistic benefits to them. We present a probabilistic voting model to study the conditions under which the ‘elite’ party is likely to choose one or the other strategy. Our findings are supported by several historical and contemporary political experiences like that of the BJP in India, and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated parties in Egypt, Yemen, and Indonesia.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09361-1

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