Coalitional manipulation of voting rules: simulations on empirical data

François Durand ()
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François Durand: Nokia Bell Labs France

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 3, No 10, 390-409

Abstract: Abstract Using computer simulations based on empirical data, we show that seven voting rules that we call the IRV family (Instant-runoff voting, exhaustive ballot, Condorcet-IRV, Benham, Smith-IRV, Tideman and Woodall) are less sensitive to coalitional manipulation than a large selection of prominent voting rules. While the relative performances of these seven rules still deserve further investigation, we show that the differences are at most marginal.

Keywords: Computational social choice; Coalitional manipulation; Strategic voting; Instant-runoff voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09376-8

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