The case for Instant Runoff Voting

Rob Richie (), Jeremy Seitz-Brown and Lucy Kaufman
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Rob Richie: FairVote
Jeremy Seitz-Brown: FairVote
Lucy Kaufman: FairVote

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 3, No 8, 367-377

Abstract: Abstract Instant runoff voting (IRV) is an electoral system that produces better elections and more representative outcomes in races with three or more candidates. Used by over 50 American jurisdictions, IRV addresses the challenges of plurality voting in crowded candidate fields. It upholds majority rule, promotes voter engagement, discourages personal attacks, and minimizes strategic voting. IRV is preferable to runoff systems and other proposed single-winner methods. In comparison to runoffs, IRV produces higher, more equitable turnout and reduces costs and demands on voters. In contrast to methods based on rating candidates, voters in IRV elections have incentives to indicate their honest preferences. IRV demonstrates greater political viability and more intuitively fair outcomes than Condorcet methods. For legislative elections, IRV complements the single transferable vote, which is the best way to address the U.S.’s governance and polarization crises, end gerrymandering, and secure fairer representation for all.

Keywords: Instant runoff; Ranked choice; Majority voting; D71; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09379-5

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