The best Condorcet-compatible election method: Ranked Pairs

Charles T. Munger ()
Additional contact information
Charles T. Munger: Hold Politicians Accountable

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 3, No 13, 434-444

Abstract: Abstract Condorcet-compatible election methods are examined and compared. The Ranked Pairs method proves significantly better than Beatpath; that both are clone-free, and have other desirable properties, makes them much better than any alternative.

Keywords: Ranked Pairs; Beatpath; Kemeny–Young; Ranked choice ballots (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D71 D72 H11 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-022-09382-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/10602/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w

Access Statistics for this article

Constitutional Political Economy is currently edited by Roger Congleton and Stefan Voigt

More articles in Constitutional Political Economy from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().