Stable Voting

Wesley H. Holliday () and Eric Pacuit ()
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Wesley H. Holliday: University of California
Eric Pacuit: University of Maryland

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 3, No 12, 433 pages

Abstract: Abstract We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate $$A'$$ A ′ who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between such candidates). We call this principle Stability for Winners (with Tiebreaking). Stable Voting satisfies this principle while also having a remarkable ability to avoid tied outcomes in elections even with small numbers of voters.

Keywords: Voting systems; Ranked ballots; Condorcet winner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09383-9

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