The case for the five in final five voting

Katherine Gehl ()
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Katherine Gehl: Institute for Political Innovation

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 3, No 2, 286-296

Abstract: Abstract My central concern is not, which electoral system would elect the best winner, but rather: which electoral system would be most likely to elect a Congress that would deliver optimal democratic outcomes? I use a theory of politics as an industry, first presented in Gehl & Porter (2017), that analyzes incentives and behaviors through the lens of competition. I argue that the optimal system is Final Five Voting (FFV), which is the combination of an open top-five primary and instant runoff voting (IRV) in the general election. Open, non-partisan primaries that select two candidates exist in California and Washington, while Alaska elects four in its open primary. Here I explain why the optimal number of candidates to advance from the primary to the general election is five.

Keywords: Final Five Voting; Political system; Partisan gridlock; Election reform; Political innovation; Political parties; Healthy competition; Party primary; Instant Runoff Voting; Plurality Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09386-6

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