STAR Voting, equality of voice, and voter satisfaction: considerations for voting method reform

Sara Wolk (), Jameson Quinn () and Marcus Ogren ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 3, No 4, 310-334

Abstract: Abstract The vote itself forms the foundation of our political discourse, and how we vote may be the single most important decision in a representative democracy. In the pursuit of more fair and representative elections, we explore common electoral pathologies like vote-splitting, Favorite Betrayal, and the center-squeeze Spoiler Effect, and discuss criteria and methodology for evaluating voting method quality. We introduce STAR Voting for consideration in place of Plurality and Instant Runoff Voting for governmental elections, and compare it to other leading voting method proposals. To evaluate voting method accuracy and strategy resilience, we present the metrics Voter Satisfaction Efficiency (VSE) and Pivotal Voter Strategic Incentive (PVSI). We find that compared to Plurality Voting, all methods tested substantially reduce the need for voters to consider candidate electability but that STAR Voting, Smith/Minimax, the Condorcet method included, and Approval Top Two go further to ensure an equally weighted vote. We conclude that STAR Voting in particular offers a viable, competitive, and compelling proposal for more representative elections.

Keywords: Voting system; Expected social utility; One person one vote; Strategic voting; Cardinal preferences; Ranked choice voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D63 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09389-3

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