The case for score voting

Warren D. Smith ()
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Warren D. Smith: Center for Range Voting

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 3, No 3, 297-309

Abstract: Abstract Score voting (also called range voting) uses a ratings ballot. Each voter assigns (to as many candidates as she wishes) a number in a specified range. Greatest average score wins. Two main lines of evidence show score voting is a good decision-making method: biology and computer simulation. Honeybees achieved evolutionary success by annually deciding their new hive location via score voting. Some ants also use score voting. Computer simulations have been used to compare score versus other election methods by the criterion of Bayesian regret (BR), i.e. the expected value of the avoidable human unhappiness caused by an action—in this case the use of an election method. Score voting consistently outperforms other election methods measured by BR. Score voting also is among the simplest voting methods.

Keywords: Score voting; Range voting; Bayesian regret; NESD; 2-Party domination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09403-2

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