Election cycles and corruption perception in Africa

Abdul Ganiyu Iddrisu ()
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Abdul Ganiyu Iddrisu: University of Aberdeen

Constitutional Political Economy, 2023, vol. 34, issue 4, No 4, 553-571

Abstract: Abstract This paper empirically examines whether Africa’s low corruption agenda can be achieved amid election cycles. We employ country-level data from 36 African countries covering the period 1998–2020. Using fixed effects, random effects and dynamic panel data regressions, our results suggest that in election years, increment in government expenditure is associated with higher corruption perception while increment in real GDP growth lowers corruption perception than in non-election years. On regional differences, the effect of election cycles on corruption perception was found to be greater in southern part of Africa than the rest of the sub-regions. These findings may have important implications for policy.

Keywords: Election cycle; Corruption perception; Democracy; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 E5 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09388-4

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