Fake marriages, asylum, and gas station robberies: institutional determinants of migrants' strategies

Joshua Bedi ()
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Joshua Bedi: Copenhagen Business School

Constitutional Political Economy, 2024, vol. 35, issue 1, No 3, 45-72

Abstract: Abstract I study institutional and political determinants of migrants’ immigration strategies using the United States’ immigration system as a case study. Drawing from work that theoretically connects decisions to immigrate legally vs. illegally as well as theoretical insights from literature on the economics of crime, I show how relative probabilities of successful migration using different strategies and relative utility gained using different strategies weigh heavily in immigrants’ calculus. To do so, I use qualitative evidence of migrant strategies in the face of migration policy constraints. These various policy constraints lead to a variety of different tactics revolving around decisions regarding whether to immigrate legally, to commit visa fraud, or to choose one type of visa over another. In the process, I also build on a rich body of Public Choice literature to demonstrate how complicated regulatory systems, in this case regulatory systems that quantitatively restrict migration, encourage rent-seeking by both migrants and nonmigrants.

Keywords: Immigration; Institutions; Policy; Visas; Rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 J68 K37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09400-5

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