Much ado about nothing: voting in sixteenth-century Republic of Genoa

M. Cristina Molinari

Constitutional Political Economy, 2024, vol. 35, issue 2, No 5, 327-348

Abstract: Abstract When the constitution of the Republic of Genoa was rewritten in 1528, the traditional distinction between nobili and popolari was abolished and the now unified ruling class was organised into 28 groups called alberghi, which were granted equal political representation by an elaborate and bizarre voting mechanism. Using data on the composition of the Genoese nobility in 1528, we simulate the rounds of voting, nominations, and sortition of the electoral protocol to reveal how they determined the allocation of power. Our analysis shows that the constitutional reform could not succeed in bringing concord to the nobility, as the system was heavily biased towards the popolari (later renamed nobili nuovi), who could gain control over all key magistracies. We also show that the use of the alberghi for office allocation made the system less favourable to the nobili nuovi, but only marginally so. These results help explain the persistence of political instability in Genoa after the 1528 reform, and they shed light on the voting system reforms that followed.

Keywords: Early modern elections; Factionalism; Genoese alberghi; Voting protocols (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 D72 N43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09414-z

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