Comment on “The best Condorcet‑compatible election method: Ranked Pairs”

Markus Schulze ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2024, vol. 35, issue 3, No 6, 439-442

Abstract: Abstract In the paper “The best Condorcet‑compatible election method: Ranked Pairs” (Munger in Const Polit Econ 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w ), the author identifies Tideman's ranked pairs method as the best single-winner voting method, while the Schulze method (Schulze in Soc Choice Welf 36(2):267–303, 2011; The Schulze method of voting, 2018. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.02973v12.pdf ) comes in a close second. Munger (Munger in Const Polit Econ 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09382-w ) writes: “Beatpath (Schulze) emerges as Ranked Pair's chief competitor”. In this comment, I will show that the scenario that Munger uses to argue against the Schulze method is not possible.

Keywords: Ranked pairs; Schulze; Beatpath; Kemeny–Young; Ranked choice ballots (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D71 D72 H11 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09415-y

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