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Comment on "The case for minimax‑TD"

Markus Schulze ()

Constitutional Political Economy, 2024, vol. 35, issue 3, No 5, 437-438

Abstract: Abstract In recent papers, Darlington identifies minimax‑TD as the best single-winner voting method. He mentions two criteria allegedly met by minimax‑TD and violated by the Schulze method. In this comment, however, I will show that also minimax‑TD violates these criteria.

Keywords: Minimax; Voting systems; Condorcet; Voting anomalies; D71; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09416-x

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