Correction: Coalitional manipulation of voting rules: simulations on empirical data

François Durand ()
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François Durand: Nokia Bell Labs France

Constitutional Political Economy, 2024, vol. 35, issue 3, No 8, 445-446

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s10602-023-09424-x

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